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This paper analyses intergenerational educational mobility using survey data 
for twenty countries. We find that a number of interesting patterns emerge. 
Estimating a measure of mobility as movement and an index of mobility as 
equality of opportunity we find that while these two measures are positively 
correlated, the correlation is far from perfect. Examining the link with 
educational inequality we find evidence which suggests an inverse 
relationship between mobility and inequality consistent with egalitarian 
theory. The relationship between mobility appears to be weak, high returns 
to education do not depress mobility, as some human capital theories  would 
suggest. Mobility appears to be somewhat higher for men whereas equality 
is much the same for both sexes. There is evidence that mobility as equality 
of opportunity has risen consistent with modernization theory. There is no 
evidence that expansion of third level education has led to a fall in the 
penalty associated with having a low educated parent. Estimates of marginal 
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1 Introduction 
 
People who are well educated are likely to have children who are also well educated. 
The converse holds for people who have low education. This simple stylised fact 
holds to varying degrees in all societies for which we have reliable data. It is clearly 
of importance to parents and their children themselves. It is important to policy 
makers since it has implications for the workings of a countries’ educational system: 
if the relationship between childrens and parents education is, in some sense, too 
strong this suggest a lack of opportunity for those  with a less educated background. 
For social scientists, particularly sociologists, it is also important since education is 
likely to be an important part of the process which gives rise to social stratification. 
Economists have recently developed an interest in this topic since theoretical models 
of educational financing have strong implications for educational mobility 
 
This paper examines the educational mobility between fathers and their children using 
the International Adult Literacy Survey for 20 countries.  We present results for 
fathers only but in the following literature review some of the issues consequent upon 
this choice will be considered.  These centre largely on the parents and family since it 
is within the familial context (whatever shape it may be) that the mobility takes place.  
Comparison across countries of educational mobility patterns is not easy given the 
enormous differences between national educational systems.  However, in the 
literature review we try to capture some of the patterns in educational distributions 
that have occurred. It should be noted that most of the literature which refers to 
education and mobility also refers to social class/social mobility something we are 
keen to minimise in the study for the present.We outline some of the relevant research 
literature below. 
 
Familial Influence: The Theory and the Results 
There are a number of channels through which parents can influence the educational 
outcomes of their children. Studies by Entwistle and Alexander (1992, 1994) use the 
BSS (before school study) Baltimore study to examine the reading and math 
comprehension of young children.  These studies are used to look at early schooling 
and educational inequality.  They examine the role that parents play in their children’s 
educational mobility.  They believe that attending school may help low socio-
economic status youngsters in part because it provides a setting where family stresses 
are temporarily screened out.  The second theory emphasises the different roles that 
parents of various socio-economic status backgrounds set for themselves with respect 
to their children’s education.  Middle-class parents conceive of themselves as active 
partners in the education of their children, while working class parents prefer to leave 
the role of educator to the school (Lareau, 1987).   
 
Entwistle and Alexander noticed that the scores for children differed according to 
season, which could reflect parental involvement for better-off children.  Thus, when 
school was in session parental effects were redundant but when school was not in 
session, in summer, it added importantly to student achievement.  High socio-
economic status parents take over the role of teacher in summer and because of high 
contact with the school in winter they know the level and kind of experiences that 
their children are ready for.  So, summer decrement in children’s progress illustrates a 
lack of a “special kind of human capital”.  Thus, we may modify our opening  2 
statement: most people who are well educated and well off are likely to have children 
who are well educated.   
 
A third theory relates to another kind of human capital.  In their analysis of BSS data, 
they find that parent’s expectations are powerful predictors of children’s performance, 
irrespective of socio-economic status.  These results are corroborated by other 
researchers even reporting parent’s expectations to be more potent than the child’s IQ 
in predicting school performance (Parsons et al 1982). This is also found by Dearden 
et al (1997). One could extrapolate here that better educated and/or motivated parents 
would be more likely to influence their child’s educational attainments. 
 
Entwistle and Alexander (1992) note that low socio-economic status parents are just 
as likely to hold high expectations for their children as high socio-economic status 
parents are but the latter were found to be more better informed about the child’s 
performance level than those of low socio-economic status parents.  High socio-
economic status parents are good at processing information furnished to them by the 
school that will help them monitor the child’s schooling.  Their expectations are also a 
useful resource for the child.  Earlier research by Entwistle and Hayduk (1982) found 
that lower socio-economic status children were influenced by their parent’s 
expectations only in the first semester of the first grade.  Thereafter, parents 
expectations had much less influence on these children, perhaps, because they found 
their parent’s expectations were not particularly useful as sources of information.   
Higher socio-economic status children continued to respond to their parent’s 
expectations as far as they were followed in the study (to the 3
rd grade).   
 
Data used in the above studies can suggest only that home resources found in high 
socio-economic status families have some role in promoting children’s achievement 
in the summer months.  The human resources that usually accompany material 
resources may hold the key, such as parental level of education. 
 
Work by Schneider and Coleman (1993) reflects the increasing emphasis placed by 
Coleman on the role of the family in the development of the young person’s cognitive 
skills.  Their report focuses on the nature and consequences of parental involvement, 
family home, school and community.  Parental involvement was assessed along with 
family composition and maternal employment on cognitive outcomes.  The 
characteristics of schools that foster or impede parental involvement in school were 
considered.  Finally, the factors that determine parental choice of schools were 
analysed
2.  Schneider and Coleman found that structural deficiencies in families i.e. 
non-intactness could be overcome by functional strengths as reflected in parental 
involvement with the child.  Modifying our opening statement, people who are well 
educated and who promote educational attainment are likely to have better educated 
children. 
 
The studies referred to above discuss how the characteristics of a father and mother 
might influence the value that each places on a child’s educational level and thus 
affect the levels of educational mobility.  That influence might be gender specific.  A 
mother’s socio-economic background, for instance, might affect not only her values 
                                                 
2 For evidence of this choice see for example Machin and Gibbons(2002) who assess the value attached   
by parents to school quality by looking at house prices.  3 
but also those of her husband.  Alternatively, the background of the father, for 
example, could influence the values of the mother as well.  In social mobility studies, 
conditions of work such as degree of autonomy or the complexity of a job are 
traditionally considered as part of the father’s occupation, which leaves the impact of 
the mother’s social position unaccounted for (Kohn, 1989).  If all mothers were in 
paid work, the labour conditions for both parents could be considered but this would 
mean restricting the study to a dual-earner couple.  By way of contrast, using levels of 
education rather than occupation simplifies the study to one of straightforward 
educational mobility.  The present study concentrates on the level of education as the 
background variable for fathers only.  There are problems with this choice such as the 
effect of mother’s education on their children.  Mare (1996) showed that mother’s 
educational level did influence that of their daughters. Indeed Behrman(1997) shows 
that this the strongest relationship. 
 
The attention that should be given to both father’s and mother’s level of education is 
also prompted by dissatisfaction with measures that are often presented as “family” 
measures but are restricted to father’s occupation or income.  Acker (1973) recognises 
this restriction as paternalistic but it has also led to a conceptual gap on the 
importance of the wife/mother in the family situation and any potential they may have 
in the mobility process. This gap begs the question how does the nature of a father’s 
education influence the role of his wife. For the purposes of the present study we are 
looking at educational mobility in the traditional way, that is, according to 
father’s/husband’s level.  Any further study should think about following in the 
footsteps of  Van der Slik, De Graaf and Gerris (2002) and consider the parent’s 




While the present study covers a large number of countries, such an exercise is not 
without its problems. Shavit and Blossfeld (1993) and Müller (1991) point out how 
difficult it is to look at the distribution of qualifications compared across countries let 
alone look at the issue of cross-national educational mobility.  The countries that we 
are analysing differ considerably in the historical development of their educational 
systems and in the educational options available to the members of the cohorts studied 
when they were of school age.  The outcomes of schooling can be seen according to 
the qualification levels distinguished in scales such as the CASMIN scale.   
 
Müller shows that the differences in educational distributions are quite marked among 
the nine CASMIN nations.  Only two aspects were common to the countries studied.  
Firstly, more people gain only an elementary qualification than any other.  Secondly, 
all countries have a similar proportion of graduates with the highest level of 
qualifications.  The proportion of university level graduates varies in a narrow range 
between above four and below seven percent. 
 
Müller’s distributions show that two blocks of countries can be identified.  First, there 
are the countries of Britain and Ireland.  In terms of the distribution pattern, Sweden is 
quite close to Britain/Ireland even though historically Sweden would be regarded as 
being closer to the German tradition with respect to higher education.  The second 
block of countries close to one another is represented by Poland and Hungary.  In the 
period before the communist transformation, German and German-Austrian  4 
influences on the education system in both countries have to be acknowledged.  The 
similarities between Hungary and Poland in that period result mainly from their 
economic retardation.  More than half of all employment was in agriculture.  In rural 
areas educational opportunities were sparse.  This accounts for the large proportion of 
people who had not completed compulsory schooling.   
 
Hout (1989) noted that in rural areas education may have a limited value, especially 
where children expect to follow in their father’s footsteps as farmers.  As Gambetta 
(1987) noted, working on the family farm or in the family business would have been 
viewed as a more rational investment than education.  Many of the rural areas in our 
data set will have faced difficulties in organising education.  Overall, it can be 
expected that there is a relatively high chance of those from farm origins having low 
level qualifications.  However, the disadvantage of the farm sector may be greatly 
reduced if it contains a relatively high proportion of wealthy farmers.  It is also 
possible that policy efforts have been made to incorporate rural areas into an 
education system that offers at least a second level education (Jonsson 1993; Breen 
and Whelan 1996). 
 
The similarity in development between Hungary and Poland after the second world 
war results from their common policy of communism and their adaptation to the 
Soviet philosophies of education.  There was one main difference between Poland and 
Hungary and it is that Poland did not develop educational courses leading to 
intermediate certificates.  Thus, the proportion of Polish cohorts assigned to the 
intermediate qualification is very small. 
 
Outside of the British/Irish block and Polish/Hungarian block, France and Germany 
are very distinct and can be said to represent the extremes in the sample of nations.  
For France, if we look at the aggregates for the three qualification levels, elementary, 
secondary and tertiary we find the most skewed distribution of all nations as a result 
of the very strong selectively institutionalised French school system.  Germany, on the 
other hand, has the most even distribution.  Germany is unique in many ways due to 
it’s emphasis on vocational training.  In the German case only a small minority leave 
school with the minimum of compulsory schooling. 
 
The picture of varying qualification structures found in the CASMIN data at the 
beginning of the 1970s gets more complex if one takes into account the fact that these 
cross-sectional distributions are aggregates of cohorts with very different educational 
opportunities at the historical times that they were of school age.  This is a problem 
with the IALS data which we have tried to overcome with the use of cohort analysis.  
In the CASMIN data the proportions of those who received only elementary education 
strongly declined whereas the proportions of intermediate and higher education 
increased.  In France, this process started from a higher level of elementary education 
and it did not proceed as far as other nations.  The smallest amount of change took 
place in Germany. 
 
Overall, on the basis of Müller’s work on the CASMIN data set one can say that there 
were considerable differences in the educational opportunities and educational 
outcomes between the nations studied.  They result from different education traditions 
and different institutions of educational provision that affect the decisions of parents 




One of the few studies to focus on educational mobility is a study by Checchi et al 
(1996) comparing the US with Italy.  They argue that the more centralised state 
school system in Italy should be expected to reduce income inequality and make 
intergenerational mobility easier.  The authors were surprised to discover that the US, 
which they regarded as having a bigger private education system, displays higher 
intergenerational upward mobility between occupations and more importantly 
between education levels.  They offer a human capital explanation building around 
the idea that even though it may be easier in Italy to move up the social ladder the 
incentive to move may be lower making mobility less likely.   
 
In the US system the fact that family background is less important than in the Italian 
system in which education is centralised and public is a question that they explicitly 
address in their paper.  The prevalence of non-competitive labour markets and barriers 
to entry/exit into/from occupations can explain only part of their observed evidence.  
The authors propose an explanation that highlights a “distortion of the incentives to 
human capital investment and to upward mobility that a centralised public education 
system generates” (Checchi et al: 21).  The individual incentive to accrue human 
capital is reduced for two reasons when the same quality of education, supported by 
income taxes, is offered to everyone.  Firstly, tax on income reduces the direct benefit 
to the person who decides how much work to put into the schooling activity.   
Secondly, it is impossible to equal greater talent and individual effort with a better 
education.  A father who expects their child to be talented can provide them with a 
better education out of their own income whilst in the state school system his financial 
contribution is to a common fund and therefore has no specific effect on the child.   
 
Thus, when the quality of education is relatively more important for the accrual of 
human capital, the state system should display more mobility because across the 
income groups the incentives to go to school rather than not go are similar. Checci et 
al cannot prove from their data set that this is the reason for the low level of social 
mobility in Italy in comparison to the US.  However, their analysis of educational 
mobility seems to offer a more plausible explanation.  The opportunities of reaching 
the higher educational category are more unequally distributed in Italy than the US.  
The odds of reaching a high school degree or more are larger if the father is in the 
same educational category (the odds ratio is 27.3).  They show that only the 
Bartholomew index of movement indicates more mobility for Italy.  However, this is 
an indicator of movement and not of equality of opportunities.  This index has been 
driven by the structural change towards higher education that was typical of Italy in 
the post-war period.  However, it masks the existence of unequal opportunities.   
 
In order for a state school system to generate more mobility than a private system (as 
they describe the US) it has to be relatively more efficient in  selecting talent and 
reward individual effort.  This explanation relies on another part of their theoretical 
framework and that is the role of self-confidence in determining the likelihood of an 
investment in human capital.  When making an important decision about schooling a 
person has besides the income and education already received by the family, a 
problematic situation: just how good are they that is how do they rate their own 
abilities?    6 
 
This self-confidence is a critical factor in each person’s decision about schooling.  
This belief summarises information about each person’s own talent.  Thus, this belief 
becomes an important way in which family background affects the decision of a child.  
Their model suggests that the assessment of the performance of a centralised 
education system (as in Italy) should take into account the relative importance of 
individual effort and of the quality of education in the accruing of human capital.  
They argue that at the elementary level of education individual effort is less 
important.  In the case of higher education, particularly at university level, individual 
effort is likely to be more important making a decentralised system like the US more 




Leaving aside the theory which emerges from the above literature review for a 
moment, we have noted that there are gender and national differences when analysing 
educational attainments.  Even a straightforward study of educational mobility 
according to father’s and mother’s level of educational attainments is problematic.  
The socio-economic background of mothers differ as well as their conditions of work 
and income.  These interact with the father’s characteristics and the complicated 
analysis that ensues is how to separate out the factors of relevance
3. 
 
Analysis of educational attainments by country show that there are both similarities 
and differences.  Across national boundaries the majority of those surveyed had 
elementary qualifications.  Similar levels of respondents had a graduate level of 
education.  In terms of similarities between the systems different blocks have been 
identified with France and Germany at the extremes in terms of how their educational 
systems work.  Importantly for this paper, Müller points out the importance of cohort 
analysis, a point which has been taken on board for this paper.  Institutional changes 
in educational systems have taken place at different periods in history. 
 
A theory common to much of the literature review outlined above is human capital 
theory.  Entwistle and Alexander note the parents, in some cases, subsume the role of 
the teacher in the summer months and also note the role played by parental 
expectations.  Schneider and Coleman stress the involvement of parents as part of the 
human capital story.  Even where families are non-intact, this problem can be 
overcome by parental involvement.  Checchi et al(1999) contribution to the human 
capital debate is the role of self-confidence.  They note that at an elementary level 
individual effort is less important.  However, it is more important at university level 
making a “privatised” system like the U.S. rather than Italy more preferable.  It 
creates the right incentives to upward mobility.  Overall, the more self-confidence that 
an individual has the more likely they are to invest in human capital. 
 
In social mobility terms we are looking at two movements:  the effect of father’s 
education on his occupational attainments; the effect of child’s education on his/her 
occupation and the effect of father’s occupation on the child’s occupation.  However, 
as we look at the effect on qualifications of occupation or income we are bringing in 
                                                 
3 Behrman & Rosenzweig(2002) attempt to separate nature/nurture effects and assortative mating 
effects by comparing the educational achievements of children of twins.   7 
elements of the labour market.  If we focus on a particular link, in this instance, 
between father’s education and child’s education, then our results are less likely to be 
contaminated by other issues, such as the labour market.  Thus, we are not looking at 
a particular transition but summarising the whole matrix of educational mobility.  We 
are looking at the five levels of education by the four possible transitions.  As our data 
is cross-sectional we will be analysing it by cohorts. So, we would expect to find 
educational mobility improving over the cohorts. This follows on from the 
modernisation theory.  It is assumed that with modernisation and the expansion of the 
educational system, that educational selection becomes more meritocratic.  However, 
following on from Müller (1991) Checci et al (2000) above we may find that the 
education mobility for our father’s and their children may rise or fall depending on the 




The International Adult Literacy Survey (IALS) was administered by twenty one 
governments between 1994 and 1998 to measure the literacy level of the adult 
population by using a common data collection structure across countries (see OECD 
(1995,1997,2000).     
 
The data for Belgium refers to Flanders only. For Switzerland, the data refers to 
French and German speaking areas though data on the Italian speaking minority was 
available. The average size of the sample per country is around 2000. The data for 
Australia is not available to researchers outside of Australia unfortunately. France 
withdrew from the study in 1995 citing concerns over comparability. 
 
For the respondent’s to the survey we know their years of education. We also know 
their education classified by levels using the ISCED scheme developed by the OECD. 
We know the fathers and mothers education level using the same scheme. To maintain 
consistency we recode the education levels variables to be:  
 
Level 1:  Primary education or less. 
Level 2:  Completed secondary education, junior cycle only 
Level 3:  Completed second level at senior level 
Level 4:  Third level, non degree 
Level 5:  Third level, with degree 
 









3 Measures of Mobility and Equality 
  8 
Since the paper makes use of a number of scalar measures of both mobility and 
inequality, it is necessary to describe them in some detail. As measures of inequality 
we use one purely statistical and one that comes from the extensive literature on 
income inequality.  
 
Coefficient of variation (Cov): This is the standard deviation divided by the mean. By 
dividing by the mean we control for the fact that the population of some countries 
may have higher levels of education than others, on average. 
 
Gini Coefficient (Gini) : This is easiest seen with a diagram. Imagine we order the 
population from the individual with the lowest education to the highest. We then, 
starting from the least educated, calculate the cumulative share of successive fractions 
of the population. For example say there are four individuals in the populations with 
education in years  10 , 12 , 13 and 15 years of education. The least educated 
individual has 10/50 = 20% of the total years of education. The two least educated 
have 22/50 = 44% of the total and the three least educated have 70% of the total. The 
graph of these cumulative shares against the corresponding number of individuals, 
expressed as a proportion of the population gives the Lorenz Curve. The highest point 
on the curve corresponds to 100% of the population having 100% of the education. If 
everyone had the same education then 1% of the population would have 1% of the 
education, 5% would have 5% and so on. In this case the Lorenz Curve would be a 
straight line at an angle of 45%. Inequality then causes the Lorenz Curve to bow down 
towards the X axis. The Gini coefficient is the ratio of the area above the curve (and 
below the 45 degree line) to the entire area under the 45 degree line. In the diagram 
below this is  A/(A+B). This will be zero with perfect equality and 1 with perfect 
inequality (where one individual has all the education in a country). If the  Lorenz 
Curve for a population X lies everywhere above that of another Y then it has a lower 
level of inequality , a lower Gini coefficient and X is said to “Lorenz dominate” Y. 
 
Figure 1 : The Lorenz Curve  
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The two measures of equality  will typically be related. For example, if the variable of 
interest, say years of education, is log normally distributed then the following can be 
shown
4: 
                                                 

























             ( 1 )  
So we expect the two indices to be positively related but certainly not linearly.  
 
Eigen value Index
5 (Ml): This index is a way of summarizing the degree of mobility 
implicit in a transition matrix. The observed transition matrix gives the probability of 
ending in one state given that one starts in some state, in other words these are 
outflow probabilities. Imagine a matrix which represents perfect equality of 
opportunities in that the probability of ending up in any state is independent of ones 
origin. This is the invariant matrix. By comparing the “distance” between the 
observed and the invariant matrix  indicate how rapidly one attains the invariant 
matrix. In such a case one’s origins are quickly “forgotten” in that their influence 
erodes relatively speedily.  The Eigen value index,  Ml is defined as 
 
2 1 λ − ≡ Ml             ( 2 )  
 
where λ  2 is the second largest eigen value, the largest eigen value of any transition 
matrix is one. If  λ  2  is equal to zero then the transition matrix equals to the limiting 
invariant matrix and corresponds to equality of opportunity. It follows then that ML 
will attain a maximum of one in a situation of equal opportunities where each 
generation’s educational outcomes are independent of the previous generations. It has 
a minimum at the other extreme where ones educational attainment is entirely 
determined by the previous generations. 
 
Bartholomew Index (Bart): This is based on measuring the average number of 
boundaries crossed (whether class, education or whatever) .  It is given by: 
∑∑ − ≡
ij
ij j i f B                ( 3 )  
f ij is the joint frequency in the i,jth cell of the transition index and the modulus of (i-j)  
is the number of changes in education level made from one generation to the next. In 
essence it is summarizing how far the population is from the principal diagonal of the 
matrix. The index attains a minimum of zero when all of the diagonal elements are 
zero and everyone has the same education level as the their parents. 
 
While intuitively one expects these indices to be correlated there is no compelling 
reason why they should display the same pattern as they reflect different underlying 
concepts. Considering the following two transition matrices of absolute frequencies 






                                                 
5 This section draws on Checchi et al (1996).  10 
                                                    Child’s education 
    A1     A 2   




























      




3      2       1                       3       2        1
 
The row totals are the same since there are 36 parents with education level 1, 9 with 
education 2 and so on. In matrix A1 every child ends up the same education level as 
their father and hence the matrix is diagonal. Since the Bartholomew Index picks up 
the extent to which individuals are away from the principal diagonal , it will attain its 
minimum value of zero in this case. In case A2 there is clearly more mobility, 
everyone in the second generation attains an education as far away as possible from 
that of their parents so the Bartholomew Index will be maximized given the marginal 
distribution of the father’s education. This index is bounded from below by zero but 
does not have a natural upper-bound (e.g. 1) though it would be easy to normalise it to 
do so. 
 
Now consider the matrix B: the probability that a child ends up with education level 3 
is 22% irrespective of one’s father’s origins (i.e 8/36, 2/9, 4/18). The same is true of 
the two other rows so there is equality of opportunity and Ml achieves its maximum of 
one. This happens because the matrix is singular, that is the rows and columns of the 
matrix are linearly dependent
6. Clearly however, by the Bartholomew Index, mobility 
is not maximized: some of the second generation end up with the same education as 
their parents. So the choice of index depends on what one’s theory tells us, if 
anything, about the form of mobility to be expected. 
 
Child’s education 
    B   














        









                                                 
6 This leads to another index , not presented here, based on  the determinant of the transition matrix. 
Similarly there is another index based on the trace that picks the extent to which the matrix is 




In this section we present and discuss our first set of results. We are interested in the 
following questions: 
 
i. What is the relationship between educational inequality and educational 
mobility? 
 
ii.  Does the above question tell us anything labour market incentives? 
 
iii.  Is educational mobility higher for males or females? 
 
iv.  Has educational mobility increased over time? 
 
 
i The Relationship between educational mobility and inequality. 
Intergenerational mobility and educational equality are two key characteristics by 
which one might judge an educational system. Equality in this context means equality 
of outcomes rather than of opportunity. Specifically, perfect equality would mean 
here if everyone had completed the same years of full time education. Note there is no 
presumption here that equality of outcomes is necessarily is desirable. For example if 
everyone had no education then inequality would be zero but this is hardly something 
that one would aspire to.  
 
This is not the only way of assessing the scale of inequality. If educational credentials 
or levels of education are seen to be the key characteristic then one could look at the 
proportion who get to third level as an indicator of ex post equality. However this may 
be more appropriate in some countries than in others so it seems sensible for the 
purposes of cross country comparisons to use a consistent indicator that doesn’t 
depend on institutional or other country specific details
7. It is also consistent with the 
enormous economic literature on the returns to education in which human capital is 
well proxied by years of schooling. If we are ultimately interested in education 
because through occupational attainment it affects earnings then the econometric 
evidence is that years of schooling is the appropriate variable to use
8.  
 
Measuring mobility raises similar issues with measuring equality: we only observe it 
ex post. Even if there are no barriers to mobility so that potential or ex ante mobility is 
high it does not follow that we will observe it if the factors which drive it – 
heterogeneity of some form within the population – is absent. Nor can we assume that 
mobility is desirable per se, as mobility can be downward as well as upward. 
                                                 
7 In section 5 when we estimate the marginal effect of parents’ education on 
educational attainment we employ such a strategy partly for reasons of parsimony. 
 
8 See Krueger and Lindahl(1999) but see also Denny and Harmon(2001) for different 
results. 
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Moreover if a country randomly allocated individuals’ education levels then this 
would generate high mobility but would not be efficient or equitable. 
 
To see what the relationship might be between mobility and equality, we need to think 
of how family background might influence one’s educational outcomes. There are 
several mechanisms that can propagate persistence over time of education. The first is 
that both the genes and the environment of children are likely to be similar to that of 
their parents. Environment here is meant broadly to refer to religious, cultural, 
geographical characteristics amongst others. The second mechanism is economic, in a 
system where education is more privately oriented i.e. supplied by private institutions 
which charge fees then well educated parents have an obvious advantage in securing a 
better education for their children. The distinction between a “public” and a “private” 
system is extreme. Many countries will have some publicly provided education, 
particularly at a lower level which may give way to more private provision at higher 
levels or there may be a mixture of public and private institutions such as tertiary 
education in the USA. 
 
There are other possible mechanisms, for example educated parents may put a higher 
value on education or be in a better position to assist their children with schoolwork. 
Alternatively if access to better schools is determined by social networks , “the old 
school tie”, then parents again will tend to pass on advantage to their children. Some 
of these are discussed in section 1. 
 
Consider an educational system where the state is the dominant influence in terms of 
financing, curriculum design, assessment and so on. Assume the state acts as “a 
benign dictator” to impose homogeneity across the system such that the quality of 
education is comparable for everyone. In such a world the children of low income 
parents are not trapped by their background so we would expect relatively low 
inequality of education: the state has removed the obvious barriers. Intuitively one 
would also expect it translate into higher educational mobility for the same reason. 
Indeed for many, educational equality (i.e. low inequality) and mobility might seem to 
be synonymous. We refer to this view as the egalitarian theory. 
 
The recent paper by Checchi et al (2000) compares the case of Italy and the United 
States. Italy has a highly centralised educational system. As expected it displays less 
educational inequality but surprisingly displays less mobility than the US. Parents 
education is relatively more important for the success of their childrens education.  
 
Their explanation for this paradox is complicated but hinges on the labour market 
consequences of such an egalitarian education system. If the education system is such 
as to compress the distribution of education and income then one expects a lower rate 
of return to education. This is strongly brought out by research on the marginal 
returns to schooling which shows that countries with more compressed earnings 
distributions, notably Scandinavian countries, have low rates of return
9. If however 
there are low returns to education then one expects this by itself to reduce mobility. 
For children of poorer families the low return to education means that is not worth 
making the investment time to acquire further human capital. There is, therefore,  a 
sting in the tail of egalitarianism. We refer to this approach as the incentive trap 
                                                 
9 See Harmon et al(2000) for a recent survey.  13 
theory. They suggest that while a homogenous, centralised system may be appropriate 
at primary level where individual effort and talent is less important, but that 
universities may be the appropriate point where poorer individuals will benefit from a 
less homogenous, egalitarian system.  
 
This argument if true has major implications for educational and social policy. While 
an in-depth analysis of two countries is useful one clearly cannot make a judgement of 
a general nature from two countries. 
 
Using data from a large number of countries we compare educational mobility and 
equality. Table 1 below shows the correlation matrix for the four measures of interest. 
The results conform with the egalitarian theory using any of the four possible 
comparisons inequality is negatively associated with mobility. Correlations only 
examine linear relationships so we need to examine the relationship in more detail. In 
Table 2 we test for rank correlations across countries. Of the four possible 
comparisons, two of the rankings are statistically significant (and negative) at the 5% 
level. To see whether the relationship is being distorted by a small number of outliers 
we graph the relationship between various pairs. Figure 2 plots the Eigen value index 
against the coefficient of variation of schooling. We superimpose a non-parametric 
smooth regression over the data which makes clear the negative curvature. Figure 3 
plots the alternative indices against each other. Aside from Chile, there is a clear 
negative relationship. Plotting the other two permutations tells a consistent story 
(closer to Figure 2): countries with egalitarian educational systems in terms of the 
outcome of schooling completed also enjoy greater educational mobility. Our results 
are not consistent in general with the incentive trap theory. Interestingly if we just 
compare Italy and the United States, the two countries studied in Checchi et al(1999), 
we find that they conform to the general pattern found here, an inverse relationship 
between mobility and inequality. Whether this is simply because of the use of 
different datasets or slightly different definitions is unclear to us at this point. 
 
ii The role of labour market incentives 
 
To see why this negative relationship exists one needs to consider whether the 
incentive effects that this theory relies on are actually that strong. To do this in an 
informal way we graph estimates of the marginal return to schooling for a subset of 
the countries of our data
10.  Figures 4 and 5 plot the return to schooling against the 
Eigen value index of mobility. The former is the estimated effect of an additional 
years schooling on hourly wages. Since returns to schooling typically differ 
significantly between males and females we plot the relationships separately. In 
general the relationship is fairly flat. However for males there is some tendency to a 
negative relationship contrary to the incentive trap theory. Figures 6 and 7 plot the 
schooling return against the Bartholomew index which tells a similar story though 
there is weak evidence of a positive relationship. For example the Scandinavian 
countries are well known to have low returns to education largely as a result of a high 
degree of compression of the income distribution. Yet this has not significantly 
depressed educational mobility compared to high return economies in less social 
democratic societies such as Britain , Ireland or the United States.  
                                                 
10 These are estimated from the ISSP data using the standard Mincer equation. Details in Denny et 
al(2001).   14 
These graphs also bring out an interesting feature of the results that the more 
corporatist social democratic Nordic countries don’t display very different levels of 
mobility from the “Anglo Saxon” economies of the US, Britain and Ireland. However 
they have may arrived at this level of mobility by very different routes. 
 
iii Are there differences between males and females? 
 
Since men and women’s experiences of both the educational system and of education 
is often quite different it is instructive to consider them separately. In looking at the 
role of schooling returns we saw above that distinguishing between sexes made little 
difference. Here we ask two questions , (i) are the levels of our indices different for 
men and women and (ii) is the relationship between educational mobility and 
inequality different? 
 
Table 3 shows descriptive statistics for males and females separately. Educational 
mobility, particularly by the eigen value index, is  marginally higher for males while 
educational inequality is essentially the same. So men have been less tied down by 
their social background in making educational transitions.  Moreover a lower level of 
educational inequality, as the egalitarian theory might suggest this, cannot explain 
this
11. If mobility is determined by the parameters of a country’s educational system 
then it somewhat surprising that it should differ between sexes since in general the 
same rules apply to men and women. It may be the case of course that there 
areinformal procedures or traditions which convey extra mobility on males. Note that 
here we are considering mobility relative to father’s education. A different picture 
might emerge if we contrasted it with mother’s education, this is beyond the scope of 
the present paper.  However if one expected fathers to discriminate in favour of their 
sons it is not clear what this would imply about mobility. For low education fathers a 
preference towards their sons would suggest more upward mobility for their sons and 
hence higher male mobility other things being equal. On the other hand, if fathers’ 
preference towards their sons is expressed as a desire to minimize risk then they will 
wish to replicate the status quo for their sons while letting their daughters fend for 
them. Hence one would expect higher mobility for daughters. Further research is 
clearly necessary on this issue. 
 
The second question that we address here is whether the inequality/mobility pattern 
by sex. In Table 4 below we give tests for rank correlations between the four possible 
pairs for males and females. It shows that in general the negative relationship between 
mobility and inequality is found for males but not for females. This would suggest 
males are largely driving the negative relationship observed in Figures 1 and 2 and 
Tables 1 and 2. 
 
iv Has the relationship changed over time ? 
In analyses of occupational or social mobility theory the modernization hypothesis 
asserts that social mobility increases over time. Since educational mobility must play 
an important role in this, it is natural to see how these indices have changed. Our data 
is not ideal for this purpose  since we have only a single cross-section for each 
country. Nonetheless the ages of the respondents vary in age from 16 to 65 (and older 
                                                 
11 Of course one would really like to know educational inequality amongst the fathers rather than their 
children but the results here are suggestive nonetheless.  15 
for a small number of countries) so we split the sample into those under 45 years and 
those older and recalculate the indices for these groups
12. Figure 8 graphs the change 
in the indices for each country. Consistent with the modernization hypothesis, 
mobility increases in almost every country. However the Bartholomew index which 
measures movement across education classes tells a very different story as shown in 
Figure 8. A significant number of countries display decreases between cohorts. Table 
5 provides descriptive statistics for the two cohorts. 
 
Given that the two indices are reflecting different notions of mobility it shouldn’t be 
that surprising that they give different results. From Table 6 one can see that the 
changes in the indices between cohorts are positively correlated, .4252 . 
 
One pattern that is consistent emerges when we graph the change in the index against 
its initial level (that is for the older cohort), increased mobility is strongly associated 
with a lower initial level as we see in Figure 10 for the case of the Eigen value 
index
13. This inverse relationship between changes and initial levels is a very common 
finding in the analysis of time series for example in the substantial literature on cross 
country growth where it is commonly denoted “beta convergence” in economic 
growth literature. It is an example of “regression to the mean”, for a variable which is 
stationary around the mean if one is above average in period one is more likely to 
move down in the next period and vice versa. What it does not mean is that there is a 
tendency towards convergence of mobility patterns across countries. Such a 
conclusions would be a case of Galton’s fallacy which despite its provenance recurs 
from time to time, see Friedman(1996). Quah(1999) shows that this negative 
relationship is consistent with either convergence or divergence over time. To 
determine whether the distribution of mobility is becoming more compressed it is 
more appropriate to look directly at the evolution of the densities: one should look at 
the change in the standard deviation: “sigma convergence” as it is known in the 
economic growth literature
14. As can be seem from Table 5 , the evidence is that 
standard deviation falls for the eigen value index and is more or less constant for the 
Bartholomew Index. 
 
This is easier to see if one looks at the estimated densities of the two indices for both 
cohorts in Figures 11 and 12. One can see that for the Eigen value index the 
distribution has clearly shifted to the right and displays lower kurtosis (it is less 
“peaked”). Curiously it has switched from being left skewed to being right skewed. 
However with a relatively small one cannot infer too much about the tails of the 
distribution. The Bartholomew Index changes relatively little however other than a 
small shift to the right. 
 
5 Multivariate analysis of the probability of attaining higher education 
In this section we explore in more details the relationship between the educational 
levels of both generations. Compared with the macro level correlations that the 
previous sections have revealed, this allows to control for idiosyncratic 
                                                 
12 Clearly the age ranges of the fathers in the two cohorts are likely to overlap. 
13 For the Bartholomew index (not shown here) the relationship is less steep but clearly negative. 
14 Barro & Sala Y Martin(199?) introduced this terminology  16 
characteristics. So while the previous section focused on summary measures of 
mobility – and hence an average- here we estimate the marginal effects of interest. 
 
For each country we select individuals ages 25-65 (in order to limit selection effects 
due to some younger individuals not having completed their education). One of the 
advantages of the IALS data is that for all countries the survey was conducted 
following essentially identical procedures to ensure comparability of scores so each 
sample should be nationally representative. Rather than study the complete 
educational decision taken by those individuals we limit ourselves to estimating the 
determinants of attending higher education. 
 
All countries in the studies have a compulsory minimum school leaving age, which is 
currently set at secondary level. Also, since secondary education is generally provided 
free or at low cost to the parents, the intergenerational relationship of interest is the 
impact of parental education on the probability of attaining some tertiary education. 
Furthermore, a recent trend in education policies has been to increase access to 
tertiary education. Thus it can be argued that this is the educational decision of 
interest. An alternative approach due to Mare(1980) looks at the sequence of staying 
on decisions by individuals at they continue through the educational system. Given 
the multi-country nature of this study this would have suggested  an excessive number 
of parameters. 
 
A simple reduced form of the decision to enrol at university has the following form: 
ε β β β + + + = X S S Uni X m m d d       ( 4 )  
 
where Uni is a dichotomous variable taking a value of unity for individuals reporting 
an education above level 4. Sg are vectors of the parental education, with g taking 
value d for the father and m for the mother. X is a set of individual characteristics and 
ε  represents an error term due to non-observable characteristics affecting the decision 
to attend college.  
 
As discussed earlier, parental education affects the decision to go to college in various 
ways. As described by Becker and Tomes (1986) more educated parents are generally 
wealthier; their children are therefore less likely to be financially constrained than 
children from less educated parents. This argument of financial constraint is the crux 
of financial support policies.  However, Cameron and Heckman (1998) for the US or 
Chevalier and Lanot (2002) for the UK show that the effect of financial constraints on 
educational choice is less important than the effect of family background (mainly 
parental education). This suggests that other arguments put forward by social 
scientists to explain the link in educational attainment between generations are also of 
importance, basically, as reviewed by Herrnstein and Murray (1994) more educated 
parents provide a “better” environment and a role model for their children
15.  There is 
                                                 
15 There has been a recent surge on research on the determinants of the intergenerational link between 
generations. The main focus is currently the debate on whether this relationship stems from nature or 
nurture. As more educated parents are likely to be more able and may transmit this ability genetically, 
researchers have been studying whether the intergenerational link is due to a positive effect of 
education per se or mostly to the inheritance of generic background.  Behrman and Rosenzweig (2002) 
advocates that most of the effect is purely genetic (at least for mothers) while Chevalier (2003) 
concludes that the nurture effect is of importance.  However, this debate is beyond the scope of the 
current paper.  17 
a wealth of evidence on the positive relationship between parental education, 
especially the mother’s, and offspring’s education
16.  The elasticity for 
intergenerational mobility in education ranges from 0.14 to 0.45 in the US (Mulligan, 
1999) and 0.25 to 0.40 in the UK (Dearden et al., 1997).  
 
Here, we will interpret the parental education effect in a broad term, as we do not 
include measures of the family wealth when the child was taking his educational 
decision. Hence, the parental education will also capture any possible wealth effects. 
 
The proportion of the population going to college varies substantially between these 
countries, as reported in Figure 13. While on average 27% of the population is found 
to have some college education, this proportion is less than 10% in Italy and four 
times higher in the USA.  Figure 13 also highlights country differences in the 
evolution of tertiary attainment over time.  Splitting the populations into almost equal 
halves (less or above 40), the average gain in the proportion of the population going to 
university is 3 percentage points.  Four countries gained more than 10 percentage 
points between the two cohorts; they are Canada (French speakers) (20.7), 
Switzerland (French Speakers) (13.8), Switzerland (Italian speakers) (11.8) and 
Belgium (Flanders) (11.3). For another four countries, there was no gain (Denmark, 
Hungary and Switzerland (German speakers) or even a loss (Germany) in educational 
attainment. So there was no clear trend on the evolution of educational attainment 
over the period. 
 
Tables 7 and 8 report for each country and gender, the estimated marginal effects of 
the paternal education on the probability of getting to university
17.  The reference 
category is having a father with the highest education level, the estimated parameters 
therefore measure the penalty associated with having a less educated father. In a more 
egalitarian/meritocratic country, parental background should have less impact on the 
likelihood of getting to university than in less equal countries.  
 
We first discuss the results for men.  For all countries and level of education, we 
observe a penalty for having a less educated father, however, in a few cases this effect 
is not linear. The most dramatic example of a non-linear relationship is Chile, where 
having a father with education level 4 is associated with a 19 percentage points 
reduction in the probability of getting to university, but having a father with level3, 
has no negative effect. This pattern is difficult to interpret.  For other countries, the 
non-linearity is less marked and usually not statistically significant.  
 
To compare the equality of educational opportunities between countries, we rely on 
two methods. The first is to focus on the penalty associated with a given level of 
paternal education, for example on the penalty associated with having a father with 
secondary education compared to university credentials.  The second method is to 
report the education level associated with a reduction of 15 percentage points in the 
probability of obtaining a university degree.   
 
                                                 
16 See Behrman (1997) for an extensive review of this literature, focusing mostly on the US and 
developing countries.   See also Mare (1996).  
17 The complete sets of estimates for each country are available from the authors. The maternal effects 
are not reported in this paper as they led to similar conclusions as the paternal effect  18 
According to the first measure, the most egalitarian countries are Chile, Italy and 
Sweden and the most unequal are Canada, the US and Switzerland (but not the French 
speaking part). With the exception of Chile, this is conformed to expectations and 
previous evidence in the literature.  Other blocks of countries are of interest. Nordic 
countries appear to be rather equal. With the exception of Denmark, having a father 
with secondary education is associated with a penalty lower than 10 percentage 
points.  The Central and Eastern European Countries are less homogeneous. The 
expectation here is that their communist past should have made the distribution of 
education in these countries relatively egalitarian. This is observed for Czech 
Republic and Poland but less for Hungary and Slovenia. 
 
This is a somewhat different result to that noted by Müller who identified Poland and 
Hungary as one block of similar countries.  Their similarity in development resulted 
from their common policy of communism and their adaptation to Soviet philosophies 
of education. 
 
Focusing on the level of paternal education associated with a drop of 15 percentage 
points in the probability of having a college education, the countries were parental 
background has the strongest effects are Canada, Switzerland (not the French 
speaking area) and Chile. On the previous measure Chile was the most egalitarian 
country, the discrepancy between the two measures for this country is rather 
uncharacteristic as a rank correlation rejects the null hypothesis that the two measures 
are independent (Table 9). On this measure, the Czech republic is the most equal 
country as no paternal education background is associated with a drop in the 
probability of getting to higher education higher than 15 percentage points.  
 
The intergenerational link appears to be weaker for women, as the negative effect 
associated with not having a father with the highest educational level tend to be 
smaller than those estimated for sons. Also, for 5 countries, there is no level 
associated with a drop in the probability of attending college higher than 15 
percentage points.  This reduced intergenerational tie between father and daughter 
compared to father and son has also been found in the literature (Behrman’s review, 
1997).  
 
Based on the first measure, the nations with the lowest penalty for having a secondary 
educated father are Finland, Britain and Ireland. The last two countries are usually 
described as “society of class”, so their apparent equality in higher education is rather 
surprising.  On another level, Müller identified Britain and Ireland as a block of 
nations with similar educational distributions.  There are differences between the two 
countries however.  Tradition in Britain, as Müller noted, relied to a limited degree on 
education for recruitment.  In Ireland, up until the advent of free education in 1967 
and beyond, education, especially in rural areas would have had a limited value.   
Working on the family farm or family business would have been viewed as a more 
rational investment.  On a note of caution, Müller noted that from the oldest to the 
youngest cohort in these countries the proportions of those who received only 
elementary education strongly declined whereas the proportions with intermediate and 
higher education increased.  
 
The bottom of this ranking is also surprising with the US, Denmark and Norway 
being the countries where the intergenerational link is the strongest.  The reduced link  19 
between father’s and daughter’s educational attainment may be responsible for some 
of the surprising results in this ranking.  However, these results are confirmed with 
our second measure of intergenerational effect, since Canada, Norway and Denmark 
are the countries where for women having a father with education level 3 or 4 is 
associated with a reduction in the probability of going to university higher than 15 
percentage points.  On the other tail of the ranking distribution, in Switzerland, Czech 
Republic or Finland, no paternal education level is associated with such a penalty. 
 
To check the consistency of the two measures of equality of opportunities in 
education, we report the country ranking by gender in Table 9.  A Kendall test of the 
rank independence rejects that for men and for women the two measures of equality 
are independent.  If the intergenerational educational link is due to institutional 
constraints, we expect the country ranking to be similar by gender.  On the other hand, 
if the paternal effect is due to a role model or broadly speaking a nurture effect of 
education on the way children are brought up, then it is possible that differences in the 
intergenerational link between father and son, and between father and daughter could 
lead to variations in the country ranking. The Kendall rank correlation for the first 
ranking confirms the assumption of institutional effect but the independence of the 
second ranking measure between men and women cannot be rejected at the 5% level 
(but is rejected at the 10% level).  So there is mixed support for the intergenerational 
link in education stemming from institutional effects.   
 
The last column of Table 9 reports an aggregate ranking based on the sum of the 
country rankings for the two measures and both genders. Overall, the most egalitarian 
countries are the Czech Republic, Finland, Italy, Sweden and Ireland, while the less 
equal are Denmark, Canada and USA.  Whilst Finland and Sweden conform to the 
Nordic model of egalitarian societies, Norway and Denmark are marked by a strong 
inter-generational link in educational achievement. Similarly, the evidence regarding 
the Central and Eastern European Countries are mixed, with Czech Republic and 
Poland being among the most egalitarian countries and Hungary and Slovenia being 
less so. 
 
Since this section has provided estimates of the marginal impact of parental education 
on access to tertiary education, a natural question to ask is whether these marginal 
effects tell a similar story to that of the mobility indices used in the previous section. 
To test this we did a Kendall test for rank correlation between the final column in 
Table 9 (the combined rank) and the two indices of mobility. In neither case could we 
reject independence. So based on these estimates marginal and average mobility are 
unrelated. 
 
Evolution of equality over time 
 
As highlighted with Figure 13, most countries have experienced an increase in the 
proportion of the population achieving tertiary education and most countries currently 
have policies of increasing access to higher education. However, a question of interest 
is whether those policies are associated with an increasing access to higher education 
children from less favoured background.  Here, we propose to test this assumption by 
comparing the paternal effect in access to tertiary education over-time.  A model 
where access to university was made universal should be associated with a reduction 
in the effect of paternal education on the choice to attend tertiary education. Whilst in  20 
a model, where the expansion of tertiary education is due to more favoured children 
getting in, we will observe no reduction (or even possibly an increase) in the paternal 
education effect.  
 
In order to obtain statistically significant results for each cohort, we pooled men and 
women.  The results of this set of regressions are summarized in Figure 14, which 
reports the estimated penalty for having a father with secondary education on the 
probability of reaching tertiary education by cohort.  For 9 countries, the paternal 
effect has decreased, the largest drop is recorded for Britain, where for the younger 
cohort, the paternal effect is basically nil. For Canada and Switzerland (not the French 
speaking area) the intergenerational link has become much stronger between the two 
cohorts.  For example for French Canadian, the penalty on the probability of gaining 
tertiary education associated with a father having secondary rather than the highest 
level of education, jumped from 22 to 52 percentage points.  
 
In the Central and Eastern European countries access to tertiary education has become 
more dependent on paternal education. Since the older cohort would tend to be from 
the pre-communist era we can test the Socialist transformation hypothesis. As 
expected we find that at least for Poland and Slovenia the marginal penalty associated 
with not having a university educated father has increased. With the exception of 
Norway, the Nordic countries have become more egalitarian. 
 
These results cast doubts on the idea that the expansion of tertiary education has led to 
a reduction of the intergenerational link. In order to shed some lights on this issue, 
Figure 15, plots the cohort differences in the proportion with tertiary education and 
the estimated paternal education effects.  There is no clear pattern in the evolution of 
access to tertiary education in relation to the intergenerational effect. In a large 
number of countries, the expansion of access to higher education has been 
concomitant with an increase in the effect of paternal education (becoming more 
negative, as Figure 15 reports penalties associated with not having a father with the 
highest educational level).   21 
 
6 Conclusions 
To know a person’s education is to know a lot about a person. It is informative about 
their occupation, their income, their attitudes to a variety of topics, where they are 
likely to live and who they are likely to marry. It also tells you something about their 
offspring. There is a universally  strong positive correlation between the education of 
parents and their children. This paper seeks to quantify the latter relationship for a 
large number of countries using a variety of methodologies. Using scalar indices of 
educational mobility as movement between generations and mobility as equality of 
opportunity we show the following: 
 
•  While these forms of mobility are positively correlated, they are far from 
identical. One needs to think about what form of mobility one is interested in 
choosing an index. 
 
•  There appears to be a negative relationship, if anything, between mobility and 
educational inequality. This is not consistent with the incentive trap theory 
discussed above. 
 
•  The relationship between mobility and labour market incentives is weak. The 
incentive trap theory would predict that low returns to education would generate 
low mobility. We find no strong relationship either way. 
 
•  Mobility tends to higher for men than women. Educational inequality, by 
contrast, seems to be much the same for the two sexes. 
 
•  There is some evidence that mobility - as equality of opportunity- has risen over 
time but mobility as movement is relatively unchanged. Increases in mobility 
have tended to be associated with those starting from a lower starting point. This 
does not imply convergence however. 
 
•  Turning to the analysis of marginal effects, the expansion of access to tertiary 
education is not always associated with an increase in mobility. 
 
•  Differences in marginal effects by sex suggest that the intergenerational link is 
not solely due to country specific institutions.  
 
•  The increased penalty associated with poorly educated parents in the four 
transition economies is consistent with the socialist transformation hypothesis. 
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7 Tables and Figures 2-12 
 
Table 1     Correlation of the four indices 
 
     n=20    |     Bart    Ml      Gini      Cov 
-------------+------------------------------------ 
        Bart |   1.0000 
          Ml |   0.3138   1.0000 
        Gini |  -0.2816  -0.3936   1.0000 
         Cov |  -0.4662  -0.5820   0.6133   1.0000 
 
 
Table 2     Tests of rank correlation: Kendall’s tau  
 Gini    Cov 
Bart -0.3766  -0.1948 
  (0.0153) (0.2147) 
Ml -0.2000  -0.3579 
 (0.2300)    (0.0297) 
    
The number in parentheses is the p value of a test for independence 
under the null.  
 
 
Table 3 Descriptive Statistics by sex 
Males 
 
             |     Obs        Mean   Std. Dev.       Min        Max 
-------------+----------------------------------------------------- 
        Bart |      20    .9305866   .1511479   .6557019   1.095383 
          Ml |      20    .6877705   .1015067    .489484   .8927329 
        Gini |      20     .164585    .034248     .12669     .27383 




             |     Obs        Mean   Std. Dev.       Min        Max 
-------------+----------------------------------------------------- 
        Bart |      20    .8999896   .1429455   .5458524   1.065197 
       Mlnew |      20    .6715682   .0799508   .5361774   .8882126 
        gini |      20     .158682   .0337476     .11496     .24873 




Table 4 Tests for rank correlations between indices by 
sex 
 
Males    
 Gini    Cov 
Bart -0.0842  0.0316 
  0.6265 0.8711 
Ml -0.0947  -0.4211 




    23 
 
 
Females   
 Gini    Cov 
Bart -0.2526  -0.1474 
  0.1273 0.3810 
Ml2 -0.0947  -0.2000 
 0.5813  0.2300 
 
    
The number in parentheses is the p value of a test for independence 
under the null.  
 
Table 5 Descriptive Statistics by cohort :  
Respondents less than 46 years  
 
             |     Obs        Mean   Std. Dev.       Min        Max 
-------------+----------------------------------------------------- 
        Bart |      20     .910367   .1583675   .6176969   1.113651 
          Ml |      20    .7439613   .1014402   .5401903   .9450729 
        Gini |      20     .149516   .0302514     .10501     .21094 
         Cov |      20    .4036205    .173401     .20126     .79009 
 
(B) Respondents 46 years or older 
 
             |     Obs        Mean   Std. Dev.       Min        Max 
-------------+----------------------------------------------------- 
        Bart |      20    .8853067    .156903   .6318393   1.081848 
          Ml |      20    .5587668    .094902   .4024441   .7572153 
        Gini |      20     .216768   .0654647     .13376     .40472 
         Cov |      20    .5693485   .2188528     .30411    1.02258 
 
Table 6 Correlations of changes in indices  between cohorts 
 
             |   ∆Β art     ∆  Ml    ∆ Gini     ∆ Cov 
-------------+------------------------------------ 
       ∆ Bart |   1.0000 
         ∆ Ml |   0.4252   1.0000 
       ∆ Gini |   0.0738  -0.3490   1.0000 
        ∆ Cov |   0.1428  -0.1329   0.7339   1.0000  24 
 
 
Table 7: Paternal educational effect on the probability of obtaining 
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Note: Model estimated by probit. The full specification also includes 
dummies for maternal education, whether child language is the official 
language of the country, whether currently living in a rural area and a 
quadratic in age at the time of the survey. The population is reweighted to 
be nationally representative. Marginal effects are reported in the first 
line for each country while T-statistics are reported in italic.  25 
Table 8 : Paternal educational effect on the probability of obtaining 
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Note: Model estimated by probit. The full specification also includes 
dummies for maternal education, whether child language is the 
official language of the country, whether currently living in a rural 
area and a quadratic in age at the time of the survey. The population 
is reweighted to be nationally representative. Marginal effects are 
reported in the first line for each country while T-statistics are 
reported in italic.  
  26 
 
 
Table 9 : Ranking of Equality of opportunities in Education 
 
  Men Women  Combined 
  Rank 1  Rank 2  Rank 1  Rank 2  rank 
Belgium (Fl.)  10 9  8 10  9 
Canada. (Eng)  22 22 20 19  22 
Canada. (Fr)  23 23 17 23  23 
Chile  1 21  11 8  10 
Czech  4 1 4 3  1 
Denmark  17 16 22 21  20 
Finland  6 2 1 5  2 
Great Britian  12 15  2  14  11 
Germany  18 17 15 16  19 
Hungary.  14 4 18  17 14 
Ireland  9 9 3 6  5 
Italy  3 7 5 7  3 
Netherlands  8 6  13  9  7 
North’ Ireland  11 12  7  13  11 
Norway  7 13  23  22 18 
N Zealand  13 14 16 15  17 
Poland.  5 5 6  12 6 
Slovenia.  16 11 19 18  15 
Sweden.  2 3 9  11 4 
Switz. (Fr)  15 8  9  4  7 
Switz. (G)  20 19 14  1  15 
        
USA  21 18 21 20  21 
Rank Correlation, 
Pr(independent)   0.0001  0.0007   
 
Note: Rank 1 is based on the estimate of the penalty associated with having a father with secondary 
education rather than the highest level of education. Rank 2 is based on the paternal educational level 
associated with a reduction of 15 percentage points in the probability of getting college education. 
Draws are separated by the estimate associated with this paternal level of education. The probability of 
independence of the two distributions of rank is calculated using the Kendall score.  27 
 
Figure 2 Eigen value index against Coefficient of variation of years’ schooling        
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Figure 3 Bartholomew Index against Gini coefficient of schooling        
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Figure 10 Changes in Eigen vale index (Ml) against initial level 
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Figure 14: Penalty in having a father with secondary education relative to 
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Figure 15: Evolution in proportion with tertiary education and paternal effect 
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